ERNEST MEDINA COURT-MARTIAL (1971)

COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH FILE

Case: United States v. Captain Ernest L. Medina
Date: August 16 – September 22, 1971
Location: Fort McPherson, Georgia
Charge: Violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
Verdict: NOT GUILTY ON ALL CHARGES

SECTION 1: DEFENDANT PROFILE

1.1 Personal Information

Field	Detail
<strong>Full Name</strong>	Ernest Lou Medina
<strong>Birth</strong>	August 27, 1936, Springer, New Mexico
<strong>Death</strong>	May 8, 2018, Peshtigo, Wisconsin (Rennes Health Center)
<strong>Cause of Death</strong>	Not publicly disclosed
<strong>Burial</strong>	Forest Home Cemetery, Marinette, Wisconsin
<strong>Age at Death</strong>	81 years old

1.2 Family Background

Father: Simon Medina (June 20, 1901 – March 15, 2000)

Ranch hand
Resided in Pico Rivera, California at time of death

Mother: Pauline Medina (died 1936 or early 1937)

Died of cancer shortly after Ernest’s birth
Ernest was sent to live with grandparents following her death

Grandparents:

Raised Ernest in Montrose, Colorado
Provided working-class upbringing in rural Colfax County

Siblings: One of two children in family

1.3 Ethnicity and Heritage

Mexican-American family
Born in Springer, New Mexico
Raised in Montrose, Colorado

1.4 Marriage and Children

Marriage:

Wife: Baerbel Dechandt (German national)
Met while Medina was stationed in Germany
Overcame language barriers during courtship

Children:

Daughter: Ingrid Medina (aged 12 in 1971)
Son: Greg Medina
Son: Cecil Medina
Eight grandchildren

SECTION 2: MILITARY CAREER

2.1 Early Military Service (1952-1964)

Colorado Army National Guard (1952)

Enlisted at age 16
Lied about his age to join
Started as radio operator
Too small to carry 65-pound pack; became cook
Attended meetings, summer programs, marched in color guard
Advanced to Sergeant First Class (E-6) within four years
Second-highest enlisted rank at that time

Post-High School Period:

Graduated from Montrose High School
Worked various odd jobs:
Forestry Service
Soda jerk
Lumber company
Hardware store
Drugstore cashier

Regular Army Enlistment (1956)

Joined Regular U.S. Army
Posted to Germany
Met and married Baerbel while stationed there
By 21st birthday: achieved rank of Staff Sergeant

2.2 Officer Training

Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, Georgia (1964)

Commissioned through OCS
Graduated fourth in class of 200 candidates
Served as battalion commander of cadet class
Earned reputation as “tough, able soldier”
Total enlisted service: 12 years before commission

2.3 Vietnam Era Service (1966-1968)

Promotion to Captain (1966)

Received captain’s bars

Command Assignment, Hawaii (December 1966)

Assigned as Captain of Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment
11th Infantry Brigade, 23rd Infantry Division (Americal Division)
Led company during training in Hawaii
Earned nickname “Mad Dog” from troops
Known for tough, explosive training style
Company developed stellar reputation under his leadership

Vietnam Deployment (December 1967)

Charlie Company arrived in Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam
Assigned to Task Force Barker (January 1968)
Task Force commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Barker
Mission: Pressure Viet Cong in “Pinkville” area

Combat Operations (January-March 1968)

Company suffered casualties from booby traps, mines, snipers
Never directly engaged enemy in significant firefight
Lost first member (Weber) to enemy action in early 1968
Sergeant George Cox killed by booby trap, March 14, 1968
Company frustrated by elusive enemy, mounting casualties

2.4 Awards and Decorations

Silver Star
Bronze Star Medal
Combat Infantryman Badge
Parachutist Badge

SECTION 3: THE MY LAI MASSACRE (MARCH 16, 1968)

3.1 Background and Context

Operational Environment:

Quang Ngai Province declared “free fire zone”
Area subjected to frequent bombing and artillery attacks
By end of 1967: 70% of dwellings destroyed
140,000 civilians homeless
Local population distrustful of Americans

Intelligence Assessment:

U.S. believed 48th Viet Cong Battalion operating in area
My Lai (Son My village) suspected VC stronghold
Intelligence later proved faulty
48th Battalion was actually 150 miles away

3.2 Pre-Operation Briefing (March 15, 1968)

Company Briefing by Captain Medina:

Stated Charlie Company would assault My Lai 4
Indicated facing 48th VC Battalion
Expected to be outnumbered two-to-one
Anticipated heavy resistance
Informed troops: “innocent civilians or non-combatants” would be at market by assault time
Ordered: Destroy village by burning hootches, kill livestock, destroy food crops, close wells

Disputed Orders:

Some soldiers testified Medina ordered: “kill everybody that was in that village”
Others recalled Medina being asked “Do we kill women and children?”
Medina later testified he answered: “No, you do not kill women and children. You must use common sense”
Added qualifier: “if they have a weapon and are trying to engage you, then you can shoot back”

Memorial Service:

Held for Sergeant Cox (killed March 14)
Highly emotional atmosphere
Intensified troops’ desire for revenge

3.3 The Assault (March 16, 1968)

Timeline of Events:

Time	Event
Pre-7:30 AM	Artillery preparation of landing zone
7:22 AM	Nine helicopters lift off for My Lai 4
~7:30 AM	Charlie Company lands in rice paddy 140 yards south of village
7:30 AM – 8:00 AM	1st Platoon (Calley) and 2nd Platoon (Brooks) enter village
8:00 AM – 12:00 PM	Systematic killing of civilians
~10:00 AM	Medina issues cease-fire order
~11:00 AM	Bulk of killing concluded
Afternoon	Company moves to night laager position

Command Structure During Operation:

Captain Medina: Company Commander (ground)
Lieutenant William Calley: 1st Platoon Leader
Lieutenant Stephen Brooks: 2nd Platoon Leader
Lieutenant Larry LaCroix: 3rd Platoon Leader (reserve)
Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker: Overall commander (helicopter at 1,000 feet)
Colonel Oran Henderson: Brigade commander (helicopter at 2,500 feet)

Key Actions:

No enemy resistance encountered
Only U.S. casualty was self-inflicted
Soldiers divided into small groups of 5-8 men
Systematic killing began immediately upon village entry
Victims included elderly men, women, children, and infants
Some women were gang-raped before being killed
Bodies mutilated
Children as young as 12 victimized

3.4 Casualties

Source	Civilian Death Count
Peers Commission (CID Census)	347
Son My Village Chief Report	504
Medina's Initial Report	90 (later 20-28)
Lieutenant Calley's Platoon	90-130 (one-third of total)
My Khe 4 (Bravo Company)	~90 additional

Victim Demographics:

Predominantly women, old men, and children
Almost all unarmed
No confirmed Viet Cong combatants among dead

3.5 Hugh Thompson’s Intervention

Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson:

Pilot, 123rd Aviation Battalion
Flying observation helicopter supporting Task Force Barker
Witnessed civilians being killed

Actions Taken:

Landed helicopter between U.S. soldiers and fleeing civilians
Ordered crew chief to “open up on the Americans” if they fired at civilians
Rescued approximately 16 civilians
Extracted baby clinging to dead mother
Filed official complaint alleging war crimes

Impact:

Thompson’s radio reports transmitted on recorded frequencies
Led to eventual cease-fire order
Senior officers canceled similar planned operations
Thompson ostracized by many peers afterward

3.6 Medina’s Personal Actions (Disputed)

Allegations Against Medina:

Criminal Investigation Department reported Medina directly killed civilians on three occasions
Abused noncombatants on other occasions
Participated in reporting inaccurate civilian death counts

Specific Incidents:

The Woman (Admitted):

Medina admitted shooting a wounded Vietnamese woman
Woman found hiding in ditch
When she emerged with hands up, Medina shot her
Medina’s defense: Believed she had hidden grenade
Woman was in fact unarmed

The Child (Dismissed):

Initially charged with killing small boy
Gene Oliver (enlisted man, discharged) came forward
Oliver admitted he mistakenly killed the boy
Charge dismissed by presiding judge

3.7 Cease-Fire Order

Medina issued cease-fire approximately 10:00-10:30 AM
Troops immediately complied when order given
Prosecution would later argue delay demonstrated knowledge of ongoing atrocities
Defense argued Medina unaware of extent of killings until cease-fire

SECTION 4: THE COVER-UP (MARCH 1968 – NOVEMBER 1969)

4.1 Immediate Aftermath

March 16, 1968:

Hugh Thompson filed complaint with superiors
Lieutenant Colonel Barker’s radio contact revealed concerns
Barker radioed executive officer to inquire about ground situation

March 17, 1968:

Colonel Henderson informed of Thompson’s allegations
Henderson instructed to conduct investigation
Thompson’s reports reached Major General Koster by noon

March 18-19, 1968:

Henderson conducted brief investigation
Interviewed Thompson and two aviation personnel
Spoke with Captain Medina
Conducted fly-over of My Lai area
Henderson reported: Nothing suspicious or out of ordinary

4.2 Official Reports

March 28, 1968 – Barker’s Combat Action Report:

Operation declared “successful”
Reported: 128 VC combatants killed
One U.S. casualty (self-inflicted)

April 24, 1968 – Henderson Investigation Report:

Stated 20 civilians killed
Thompson’s allegations declared “false”

April 25, 1968:

Henderson instructed Barker to conduct formal inquiry
Unorthodox: Barker investigating his own task force
Barker’s investigation concurred with Henderson

April 1968 – Army Press Releases:

11th Brigade Trident newsletter: “128 killed”
Stars and Stripes headline: “U.S. Troops Surrounds Red, Kill 128”
11th Brigade press release: No mention of civilian casualties

4.3 Efforts to Suppress

Michael Bernhardt:

Charlie Company soldier troubled by events
Planned to write letter to congressman
Medina confronted Bernhardt
Told him how “unwise” such action would be

Ronald Ridenhour’s Investigation:

Door gunner, 11th Infantry Brigade (stationed 30 miles south)
Friends in Charlie Company told him of massacre
Gathered testimony throughout 1968
Discharged from Army; continued investigation

4.4 Exposure

March 29, 1969 – Ridenhour’s Letter:

Sent to 30 prominent officials
Recipients included:
President Richard Nixon
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
Senators Kennedy, Goldwater, McCarthy, Fulbright
Congressman Mo Udall
Letter described “something very black indeed”
Most recipients ignored letter

June-September 1969:

Lieutenant Calley recalled to United States
Identified as suspect in Army inquiry
Charged with six counts of premeditated murder

November 13, 1969:

Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh breaks story
Three-part news series published
Photographs by Ronald Haeberle released
National and international outrage follows

SECTION 5: THE PEERS COMMISSION (1969-1970)

5.1 Appointment and Mandate

November 1969:

Lieutenant General William R. Peers appointed
Three-star general
Chief of Army’s Reserve Forces and National Guard
Not a West Point graduate (avoiding fraternity accusations)
Reputation for fairness and objectivity

Assignment:

Investigate My Lai incident
Investigate subsequent cover-up
Ordered by General William Westmoreland

5.2 Investigation Scope

Duration: November 1969 – March 1970 (4 months)

Statistics:

398 witnesses interviewed
399 final interviews conducted
20,000 pages of testimony compiled
Working six days per week minimum

Field Investigation (December 1969 – January 1970):

Peers flew to Vietnam December 26, 1969
Searched for Henderson/Koster investigation documents
Interviewed U.S. military personnel
Interviewed American civilian personnel
Interviewed Vietnamese government officials
Interviewed Army of Republic of Vietnam officers
Interviewed Vietnamese civilians from Son My
January 3, 1970: Flew over My Lai villages with Hugh Thompson

5.3 Key Witnesses

Name	Role
Hugh Thompson	Helicopter pilot who intervened
Ernest Medina	Charlie Company Commander
Eugene Kotouc	Military Intelligence Officer
Frederick Watke	Aviation Battalion Commander
Don Millians	Warrant Officer
George Young	Brigadier General
Lawrence Colburn	Door gunner
Oran Henderson	11th Brigade Commander
Samuel Koster	Americal Division Commander

5.4 Findings on Medina

According to the Peers Report, Medina:

“Planned, ordered, and supervised the execution by his company of an unlawful operation against inhabited hamlets in Son My Village which included the destruction of houses by burning, killing of livestock, and the destruction of crops and other foodstuffs, and the closing of wells. And impliedly directed the killing of any persons found there.”

Additional Findings:

Informed troops any residents might be Viet Cong or sympathizers
Caused soldiers to believe they would find only armed enemy
Directly contributed to killing of unarmed noncombatants
Participated in reporting inaccurate civilian death counts

5.5 Peers Commission Conclusion

Report Delivered: March 14, 1970

Findings:

“A tragedy of major proportions occurred there on that day”
Highly critical of top officers for cover-up participation
Named 30 individuals who suppressed evidence
Recommended charges against multiple officers and enlisted men

SECTION 6: CHARGES AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

6.1 Charges Filed (March 10, 1970)

Ordering Authority: U.S. Army following Peers Commission

Initial Charges:

Assault with a deadly weapon
Premeditated murder

Final Charges at Trial:

Involuntary manslaughter of “no less than 100” Vietnamese civilians
Premeditated murder of one Vietnamese woman
Two counts of assault against a prisoner

6.2 Legal Basis

Article 77, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ):

Charged for willingly allowing his men to murder allied civilians

Fourth Geneva Convention Limitation:

Article 4 excluded South Vietnamese civilians from “protected persons” status
Co-belligerent status prevented international law prosecution
Prosecution limited to U.S. military law

6.3 Command Responsibility Doctrine

Yamashita Standard:

Named for Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita
Executed by Allied tribunal for subordinates’ war crimes in Philippines
Commander liable for failing to control troops
Precedent: Knowledge of atrocities + failure to act = criminal liability

Army’s Law of Land Warfare:

Embraced Yamashita Standard
Prosecution required proving:

1. Medina had direct knowledge of killings

Medina failed to stop them
His inaction was proximate cause of deaths

Resulting “Medina Standard”:

Case established new precedent in U.S. military law
Commander criminally liable only with “actual knowledge”
Must know of violations and fail to act to stop/prevent them
More restrictive than Yamashita Standard

SECTION 7: THE COURT-MARTIAL

7.1 Trial Information

Field	Detail
<strong>Start Date</strong>	August 16, 1971
<strong>End Date</strong>	September 22, 1971
<strong>Location</strong>	Fort McPherson, Georgia
<strong>Duration</strong>	Approximately 5 weeks
<strong>Trial Judge</strong>	Colonel Kenneth A. Howard
<strong>Panel President</strong>	Colonel William D. Proctor

7.2 Prosecution Team

Role	Name	Rank
Chief Prosecutor	William G. Eckhardt	Major

Major William G. Eckhardt:

B.A. with honors, University of Mississippi (1963)
LL.B. with honors, University of Virginia (1966)
LL.M. Equivalent with honors, Judge Advocate General’s School (1970)
Chief Prosecutor in all My Lai cases
Later received Federal Bar Association – Federal Younger Lawyer Award
Retired as Colonel, JAG Corps after 30 years
Later: Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City

7.3 Defense Team

Role	Name	Notes
Chief Defense Counsel	F. Lee Bailey	Prominent civilian attorney
Supervisory Attorney	F. Lee Bailey	Over Mark Kadish
Defense Counsel	Mark J. Kadish	Civilian attorney
Military Counsel	Captain Gary Myers	Army JAG

F. Lee Bailey:

Born June 10, 1933
Already famous for Dr. Sam Sheppard retrial (“The Fugitive”)
Defended Albert DeSalvo (“Boston Strangler”)
Later defended Patty Hearst, O.J. Simpson
Known for media-savvy defense strategies
Considered one of greatest lawyers of 20th century

Captain Gary Myers:

Military counsel assigned to defense
Later involved in Haditha case (2006)
Represented Frederick Widmer in contempt matter

7.4 Court-Martial Panel (Jury)

Composition:

Five combat officers
All had Vietnam experience

Panel President: Colonel William D. Proctor

7.5 Key Pre-Trial Events

Polygraph Test:

Medina agreed to polygraph before trial
Administered in presence of Eckhardt and Bailey
Polygraphs inadmissible in courts-martial
However, statements during test were admissible

Polygraph Results:

Asked: “Did you order your troops to kill civilians in Sơn Mỹ?”
Medina answered: “No” (truthful response)
“Peak of tension” test administered
Asked about knowledge of killings at specific time intervals
Flat line response until 0730-0900 hours, March 16
Needle went “off the chart” for that interval

Eckhardt’s Interpretation:

Medina may not have ordered massacre
Medina may not have intended massacre
But: Medina knew massacre was occurring
Failed to stop killing until 10:00 AM cease-fire

7.6 Trial Proceedings

Prosecution Opening (August 16, 1971):

Major Eckhardt: 11 minutes
Focused on command responsibility theory

Defense Opening:

F. Lee Bailey: 16 minutes
Argued Medina unaware of large-scale killings until too late

Prosecution Evidence:

Called 31 witnesses
Attempted to prove Medina had knowledge of killings
Struggled to place Medina at scenes of shootings
No witness convincingly placed Medina within sight of mass killings

Key Prosecution Argument:

“The evidence clearly showed Captain Medina had knowledge of the killings and calculatingly chose to ignore what was happening. By his inaction, Captain Medina aided and abetted in the slayings.”

Prosecution Weakness:

Nearly every witness praised Medina as able, competent combat officer
Could not prove “actual knowledge” during killings
F. Lee Bailey noted sarcastically: “This is the first criminal case I’ve seen where the defense witnesses go on first”

7.7 Key Witnesses

For Prosecution:

Name	Role	Testimony
Ronald Haeberle	Combat photographer	Witnessed shootings; could not place Medina at scenes
John Smail	Soldier	Described boy shot by Medina's command group
Larry Polston	Shipping clerk (former soldier)	Testified about killings on trail

Key Witness Problems:

Michael Bernhardt:

Anticipated as key prosecution witness
Withdrew from testifying
Significantly weakened prosecution case

Frederick Widmer:

Medina’s radio operator
Government granted immunity to compel testimony
Captain Myers (defense counsel) challenged immunity scope
Widmer refused to testify despite contempt citation (August 25, 1971)
Invoked Fifth Amendment despite immunity grant
Another witness testified Widmer shot a small boy
Widmer’s refusal severely damaged prosecution

Bailey’s Defense Arguments:

On the Woman Shooting:

Medina feared hidden hand-grenade
Instinctively shot when woman made sudden movement
Justified by Viet Cong practice of fake surrenders

On the Child Killing:

Charge dismissed when Gene Oliver confessed
Oliver was discharged, exempt from prosecution
Admitted he mistakenly killed the boy

On Command Responsibility:

Medina not present when slaughter began
Did not have “actual knowledge” until later
Issued cease-fire immediately upon realizing situation
Troops complied with cease-fire order

On Prisoner Assault:

Medina fired twice over prisoner’s head to frighten him
Prisoner alleged to be “ranking member of Vietcong”
Medina seeking intelligence on 48th VC Battalion
As expert rifleman, “placed the shots exactly where he wanted”
Put rifle on ground pointing at prisoner to encourage cooperation
Never intended actual harm

7.8 Medina’s Testimony (September 16, 1971)

Duration: Three hours

Key Points:

Testified in his own defense
Offered “unflappable denials”
Denied ordering killings
Denied knowing of masses of corpses in ditches
Claimed he did not realize enormity of events until story broke in press
Stated he took “appropriate action” by ordering cease-fire when realizing “something was wrong”

On Pre-Operation Briefing:

Stated he told troops civilians would be at market
Denied ordering killing of civilians
Testified: When asked about killing women and children, answered “No, you do not kill women and children… Use common sense”

On Radio Communication with Calley:

Denied conversation where Calley requested permission to “get rid of” civilians
Testimony corroborated by his radio officer

7.9 Judge Howard’s Instructions

On Command Responsibility:

Prosecution must prove Medina had “actual knowledge” of killings
Must prove he failed to take necessary steps to stop them
Must prove his inaction was “proximate cause” of unlawful homicides

Critical Instruction:

Required higher standard than Yamashita precedent
“Actual knowledge” versus “should have known”
This instruction would later be criticized as error favoring defense

7.10 Closing Arguments

Prosecution (Major Eckhardt):

“The evidence submitted by 31 witnesses clearly showed Captain Medina had knowledge of the killings and calculatingly chose to ignore what was happening. By his inaction, Captain Medina aided and abetted in the slayings.”

Defense (F. Lee Bailey):

No proof Medina was aware of excessive killings until saw bodies on trail
That occurred between 10:00-10:30 AM
He then ordered cease-fire
Troops immediately complied
Demonstrated he could control troops
Therefore, lack of earlier control = lack of earlier knowledge

SECTION 8: VERDICT AND AFTERMATH

8.1 Verdict (September 22, 1971)

Deliberation Time: Approximately 60 minutes

Verdict: NOT GUILTY on all charges

Specific Acquittals:

Not guilty of involuntary manslaughter of 100+ civilians
Not guilty of premeditated murder of Vietnamese woman
Not guilty of two counts of assault against prisoner

Courtroom Reaction:

Stifled cheer and handclapping (quickly suppressed by judge)
Medina saluted the court
Returned to defense table
Blinked rapidly and swallowed glass of water

8.2 Factors Contributing to Acquittal

Withdrawal of Key Witness: Michael Bernhardt did not testify
Frederick Widmer’s Refusal: Radio operator invoked Fifth Amendment
Sympathetic Courtroom: Combat officer jury understood battlefield conditions
Prosecution’s Burden: Could not prove “actual knowledge” during massacre
Defense Team: F. Lee Bailey’s skillful cross-examination
Judge’s Instructions: High standard for command responsibility

8.3 Post-Verdict Career Impact

Denied Promotion:

Army denied Medina long-promised promotion to Major
Despite acquittal, career effectively ended

Honorable Discharge:

Date: October 15, 1971
Less than one month after acquittal
Resigned commission and left Army

8.4 Medina’s Later Admission

Post-Trial Statement:

“I had not been completely candid to avoid disgracing the military, the United States, his family, and himself.”

Implications:

Acknowledged some level of knowledge during events
Suggested testimony may have been incomplete
Believed withholding information protected multiple interests

SECTION 9: POST-MILITARY LIFE (1971-2018)

9.1 Employment

Enstrom Helicopter Corporation:

Immediately after discharge
Plant located in Menominee, Michigan
Company owned by F. Lee Bailey
Bailey provided employment to his former client

Medina, Inc. Realtor:

Family real estate business
Located in Marinette, Wisconsin
Worked there for remainder of career

9.2 Residence

Moved to Marinette, Wisconsin area
Eventually resided in Peshtigo, Wisconsin
Final residence: Rennes East Nursing Home, Peshtigo

9.3 Public Profile

Never spoke publicly about My Lai massacre
Maintained low profile throughout remainder of life
Focused on family and private pursuits
Avoided media attention

9.4 Death

Date: May 8, 2018

Location: Rennes Health Center, Peshtigo, Wisconsin

Age: 81 years old

Survived By:

Wife Baerbel
Daughter Ingrid Medina
Sons Greg Medina and Cecil Medina
Eight grandchildren

SECTION 10: RELATED PROSECUTIONS

10.1 My Lai Court-Martial Statistics

Category	Number
Total individuals charged	26
Officers charged	14
Court-martialed	Multiple
Convicted	1 (Calley only)

10.2 Lieutenant William Calley

Charges: 109 counts of premeditated murder (later reduced to 22)

Trial: November 17, 1970 – March 29, 1971 (Fort Benning, Georgia)

Verdict: Guilty of premeditated murder of 22 civilians

Original Sentence: Life imprisonment with hard labor

Sentence Modifications:

August 20, 1971: Reduced to 20 years
April 1974: Reduced to 10 years
November 1974: Paroled

Actual Time Served: 3.5 years house arrest at Fort Benning

Calley’s Defense:

Claimed following orders from Captain Medina
Testified Medina ordered “get rid of” civilians
Medina denied this conversation

10.3 Colonel Oran Henderson

Position: Commander, 11th Infantry Brigade

Charges: Cover-up of My Lai massacre

Trial Date: February 26, 1971

Verdict: Acquitted of all charges

Peers Commission Finding:

“I cannot agree with the verdict. If his actions are judged as acceptable standards for an officer in his position, the Army is indeed in deep trouble.”

10.4 Major General Samuel Koster

Position: Commander, Americal Division; Superintendent, U.S. Military Academy

Charges: Failure to obey orders and regulations; dereliction of duty

Outcome: Charges dropped (February 26, 1971)

Consequences:

Resigned from West Point
Served as deputy in Virginia
Peers Commission identified him as “motivating force behind cover-up”

10.5 Other Charged Individuals

Name	Rank	Charges	Outcome
Eugene Kotouc	Captain	Maiming, assault	Acquitted
Kenneth Boatman	Captain	Failure to report	Dropped
Charles Calhoun	Major	Failure to report	Dropped
Dennis Johnson	Captain	Failure to obey regulations	Dropped
Frederick Watke	Major	Failure to obey, dereliction	Dropped
Thomas Willingham	Captain	False statements, failure to report	Dropped

SECTION 11: HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE

11.1 The “Medina Standard”

Legal Precedent Established:

Expanded U.S. Code on command responsibility
U.S. military officers criminally liable for subordinates’ war crimes
Key requirement: “Actual knowledge” of violations
Must fail to act to stop or prevent occurrence

Comparison to Yamashita Standard:

Yamashita	Medina
"Should have known"	"Actual knowledge"
Strict liability approach	Knowledge-based liability
Japanese general executed	American captain acquitted

Criticism:

Some scholars argue Medina standard too lenient
International law generally uses “should have known” standard
Critics contend standard incompatible with international norms

11.2 Impact on Military Justice

Command Responsibility Doctrine:

Case study taught at military academies
Law schools analyze competing standards
Influenced subsequent war crimes prosecutions

Modern Applications:

Referenced in Haditha case (2007)
Gary Myers (Medina defense counsel) later defended Haditha Marines
F. Lee Bailey’s justifiable homicide arguments used as template

11.3 Cultural References

Music:

Pete Seeger, “Last Train to Nuremberg” (1970):

> “Do I see Lieutenant Calley? Do I see Captain Medina? Do I see Gen’ral Koster and all his crew?”

The Shah (Trinidad & Tobago), “The My Lai Incident” (1970):

> “And a little boy that could be anybody’s son was shot down by Medina / A platoon led by Lt.”

11.4 Impact on Vietnam War

Public Opinion:

My Lai revelation deeply shocked American public
Reinvigorated anti-war movement
Increased calls for troop withdrawal
Damaged military credibility

Conscientious Objector Filings:

Significant increase following My Lai revelations
Many cited massacre as reason for seeking CO status

Military Policy:

Army revised training on laws of war
Increased emphasis on Geneva Convention instruction
Enhanced command responsibility education

SECTION 12: SOURCE BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Peers Commission Report (March 1970)
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division files
Court-martial transcript, United States v. Captain Ernest L. Medina (1971)
Judge Howard’s Summary of Evidence
Prosecution Brief on Command Responsibility

Trial Documents

Judge Howard’s Instructions to Panel
Testimony of Captain Ernest L. Medina (March 23, 1970)
Testimony of Colonel Oran T. Henderson (December 19, 1969)
Testimony of Frederick J. Widmer (December 29, 1969)

Secondary Sources

Books:

Goldstein, Joseph et al. “The My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-Up: Beyond the Reach of Law?” Free Press, New York (1976)
Jones, Howard. “My Lai: Vietnam, 1968, and the Descent into Darkness.” Oxford University Press (2017)
Peers, William R. “The My Lai Inquiry” (1979)

Articles:

Clark, Roger S. “Medina: An Essay on the Principles of Criminal Liability for Homicide.” Rutgers-Camden Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1973)
Smidt, Michael L. “Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operations.” Military Law Review, Vol. 164 (2000)
Eckhardt, William G. Various published articles on My Lai prosecutions

Media Sources

New York Times contemporary coverage (1971)
Hersh, Seymour. Original investigative reporting (November 1969)
PBS American Experience. “My Lai” documentary
Howard Brodie courtroom illustrations (Library of Congress)

SECTION 13: ABOUT COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

The doctrine of command responsibility holds military commanders legally accountable for war crimes committed by their subordinates. The Ernest Medina court-martial established a significant precedent in American military law, creating what became known as the “Medina Standard.” Unlike the earlier “Yamashita Standard” established after World War II (which held commanders liable if they “should have known” of subordinate atrocities), the Medina case required proof of “actual knowledge” before a commander could be held criminally responsible. The five-officer panel of combat veterans deliberated for only 60 minutes before acquitting Medina of all charges, reflecting both the prosecution’s evidentiary challenges and the sympathetic atmosphere of the court. While Medina was exonerated legally, the verdict remained controversial, with the chief investigator General Peers expressing disagreement and Medina himself later acknowledging he had “not been completely candid” during proceedings. The case continues to be studied in military academies and law schools as a landmark examination of the tension between command authority, battlefield realities, and criminal accountability for war crimes.

Research compiled from multiple verified historical sources.